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Why A Nuclear-Weapons Ban is Unethical (For Now):  




The morality of nuclear weapons is back on the map because of tension between NATO and 
Russia, and because of the Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons Initiative. The new 
strategic environment suggests an opportunity to revisit principles of nuclear ethics, including 
the connection between security and ethics and the responsibility to pursue arms control and 
disarmament. For NATO, that means balancing the need for nuclear assurances with a 
commitment to disarmament and engaging with the humanitarian impacts initiative, perhaps 
by having a NATO nuclear possessor host the next conference. And for the humanitarian 
impacts initiative it means abandoning pursuit of a nuclear weapons ban and re-focusing on 
survivor testimonies as part of nuclear education and consequence management scenarios. A 
nuclear weapons ban at this time, though well-intentioned, ignores states’ security concerns 
and has the potential to undermine other disarmament efforts. 
 
Ethics and nuclear weapons do not seem to be comfortable bedfellows: nuclear weapons and 
the mass destruction they have the power to wreak are often seen to make their use morally 
unconscionable. However, the morality of nuclear weapons is back on the map once again 
due to recent trends in two sets of issues. The first relates to evolving military dynamics: 
nuclear threats have been reconsidered in light of Russia’s increased reliance on nuclear 
weapons which are both a symbol of its great power status and a tool for counter-balancing 
NATO’s conventional superiority. The second set relates to developments on the ethical 
acceptability of nuclear weapons: the Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons Initiative. 
Launched in 2012 and with three conferences to date, the initiative brings together states and 
civil society groups to explore the consequences and risks of nuclear weapons and their use. 
Some of the initiative’s participants are pressuring nuclear weapon states to disarm and are 
calling for a legally binding ban on nuclear weapons, similar to that of land mines and cluster 
munitions. Arguments in support of nuclear deterrence have been largely absent from the 
initiative thus far. 
 
The debate on the ethics of nuclear weapons has been somewhat barren since the end of the 
Cold War. However, revisiting the lessons of that period is necessary to consider the moral 
underpinnings of nuclear deterrence policies. To put it another way, the new strategic 
environment – the rise of Russia and the growth of instability – means that nuclear ethics 
need to be discussed and perhaps rethought. Nuclear ethicists from the Cold War era 
reconciled strategies of deterrence with moral pressures and identified guiding principles.1 
These principles can be applied to NATO policy in the face of nuclear aggression; they are 
also useful for the future development of the humanitarian impacts initiative. Based on these 
lessons from past experts – such as former permanent secretary at the Ministry of Defence, 
Michael Quinlan2 – an ethical nuclear policy for NATO is to maintain a credible deterrent 
while taking practical steps towards disarmament.  
 
                                                 
* I am grateful to Andrew Futter, Matthew Harries, and Benedict Wilkinson, along with the anonymous 
reviewers, for their comments on this piece.  
For the humanitarian impacts initiative, these principles mean that a ban, though well 
intentioned, is unethical at this time because it ignores the security concerns underpinning 
nuclear possession. Such a ban would not have the support of nuclear possessor states or 
states with nuclear security guarantees, but rather is expected to build public support for 
disarmament and pressure governments, similar to the ‘slippery slope’ model of land mines 
and cluster munitions. But this model has yet to prove to have had a significant impact, and- 
to state the obvious- nuclear weapons are in a different category to land mines and cluster 
munitions. A ban, such as is being proposed at this time, further divides disarmament efforts 
between those who support it and those who remain committed to the step-by-step approach 
to disarmament, as promoted within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Moreover, 
a ban is not the true objective for many states involved in the initiative; rather, they are 
merely manifesting frustration with lack of progress in other disarmament forums. The 
humanitarian impacts initiative can contribute to disarmament strategies in numerous ways 
and need not be synonymous with a nuclear weapons ban. Instead of pursuing a ban, the 
humanitarian impacts initiative can contribute by bridging the gap between nuclear 
possessors and non-possessors as NATO pursues arms control and disarmament measures.  
 
In order to demonstrate how NATO can live with nuclear weapons in an ethical manner and 
why a nuclear weapons ban is unethical, this article first examines the current challenges 
facing both NATO and the humanitarian impacts initiative. It then briefly explores the 
evolution of nuclear ethics and discusses four principles identified by Quinlan and others: 
security and ethics are intertwined; the consequences of non-use must be considered in 
conjunction with consequences of use; nuclear deterrence must be credible; and deterrence 
policies must be accompanied by arms control and disarmament efforts. It concludes by 
offering recommendations for NATO nuclear policy in the new strategic environment, and 
for the humanitarian impacts initiative as it faces an uncertain future.  
 
Returning to Nuclear Ethics  
Debates on nuclear ethics largely died down following the end of the Cold War. However, 
consideration of nuclear ethics is again important because of Russian nuclear signalling – 
which has included threats of nuclear deployments to Crimea3 – and the Humanitarian 
Impacts of Nuclear Weapons Initiative. Before turning to nuclear ethics, it is useful to 
examine the evolution of these two trends.  
 
First, Russian nuclear signalling has called into question the credibility of NATO’s 
deterrence and reassurance policies. Events in the past two years have demonstrated that the 
world is still a dangerous place and the post-Cold War stability experienced by many may be 
neither universal nor permanent – indeed, it may have been an illusion altogether. The use of 
force remains a tool for geopolitical ambitions and the resurgence of an aggressive Russia 
with claims on its ‘sphere of influence’ can no longer be ignored.4 Nuclear weapons remain 
both a symbol of great power status and a coercive tool for some possessor states.  
 
There are a number of examples of nuclear ‘sabre-rattling’ which is one component of 
Russia’s strategy.5 For decades there has been ambiguity about whether nuclear-capable 
Iskander missiles are deployed in Kaliningrad; in December 2013, news organisations 
reported that the missiles had been deployed to the Russian exclave.6 A Russian military 
exercise in March 2015 included Iskanders in Kaliningrad and nuclear-capable bombers in 
Crimea.7 Although some countries, such as the UK and the US, are working to reduce the 
salience of nuclear weapons in their national security strategies,8 Russia – like other 
conventionally weak states – is headed in the opposite direction and is relying more on its 
nuclear arsenal.  
 
Russia’s waning interest in arms control also raises concerns about strategic stability. A July 
2014 US State Department report found Russia to be in violation of the 1987 Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, suggesting it has renewed its military interest in weapons in 
the range of 500–5,500 km.9 From Russia’s perspective, it was the US that undermined arms 
control by withdrawing from the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002. Moreover, 
Washington’s conventional superiority, particularly as part of NATO, forces Russia to rely on 
its nuclear arsenal as a strategic stabiliser. Moscow rebuffed President Barack Obama’s 2013 
suggestion for a reciprocal one-third reduction in each country’s strategic arsenals in addition 
to the levels agreed in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty signed in 2010. It further 
claims that it will not return to arms control until it becomes a multilateral process and the 
issue of missile defence is resolved.  
 
Turning to the second trend, the Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons Initiative, 
launched in 2012 and with three conferences to date, has evolved from a facts-based 
discussion to a controversial ‘pledge’ in support of a nuclear weapons ban.10 One 
underappreciated impetus for the initiative is frustration with the lack of progress and 
imbalance in current disarmament forums. The NPT is admittedly imbalanced with five states 
(China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and United States) allowed to maintain nuclear 
weapons, while others are not. Since the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995, this has 
been a source of frustration due to lack of progress towards ‘general and complete 
disarmament’ by the five nuclear possessors. Stagnation in the Conference on Disarmament 
(CD) further fuels these sentiments. The CD has been in a deadlock for nearly two decades 
over failure to set a programme or work for the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off 
Treaty, with a single state (Pakistan) blocking progress. From the perspective of non-nuclear 
states and many civil society groups, therefore, further disarmament measures are being held 
hostage by a small number of nuclear possessors who are putting their regions and the world 
at risk.  
 
In an attempt to move beyond these deadlocks, states and civil society groups sought a new 
forum to explore the consequences of the detonation of a nuclear weapon and response 
options, and to be treated as equal partners in nuclear discussions. The facts-based approach 
dominated proceedings at the first humanitarian impacts conference held in Oslo, Norway, in 
March 2013. The second conference in Nayarit, Mexico, in February 2014 expanded the 
initiative’s portfolio to include nuclear risks. It concluded with a Chair’s Summary calling for 
a ‘legally binding instrument’ with a timeframe for disarmament.11 Civil society groups 
applauded the call but it was met with scepticism by many participating states, including 
NATO members. Most recently, Austria hosted a third conference in December 2014 
attended by over 150 countries, including the UK and the US. The Vienna Conference 
concluded with a pledge to ‘pursue effective measures to fill the legal gap for the prohibition 
and elimination of nuclear weapons’, which has since been endorsed by 126 states, none of 
which are nuclear possessors or under a ‘nuclear umbrella’.12   
 
Not all states in the humanitarian impacts initiative support a nuclear weapons ban. In 
contrast to those advocating a ban, Pakistan stated: ‘we believe that this humanitarian process 
should also strive for the elimination of the underlying security reasons for the possession of 
nuclear weapons in order to achieve its goals’.13 Germany similarly noted at the Vienna 
Conference that ‘nuclear disarmament takes place in a strategic context. Considering the 
current size of nuclear arsenals, it is fair to say that this strategic context should not serve as a 
pretext for not engaging in disarmament negotiations … But neither can we expect 
substantial progress if the context is ignored.’14 States in possession of nuclear weapons or 
with extended nuclear security guarantees are not prepared to dissociate nuclear weapons 
from their strategic context and do not support the ban. 
 
To date, NATO discussions have been largely security focused, whereas disarmament 
advocates in the humanitarian impacts initiative have claimed a monopoly on moral 
approaches to disarmament and excluded discussion of nuclear deterrence. As a result, the 
two communities are talking past each other and jeopardising progress towards disarmament.  
 
Quinlan’s Lessons  
Nuclear ethicists from the Cold War identified principles that can be applied to today’s 
dilemmas about how to live with nuclear weapons in as ethical a way as possible. Ethical 
debates on nuclear deterrence are not new, but typically erupt during times of tension, such as 
in the 1960s in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis.15 These debates re-emerged in the 
1980s following the Operation Able Archer crisis, the breakdown of arms control talks in 
1983 and the ongoing superpower arms race that gave rise to the Nuclear Freeze Movement 
in the US and the Greenham Common protests in the UK. With the end of the Cold War, 
disarmament advocates contended that nuclear weapons were a dangerous and costly 
obsolescence. In the post-Cold War era, they argued, security concerns included nation-
building, genocide and terrorism, rather than nuclear competition among superpowers.16 
Recent events suggest great power competition never went away and nuclear weapons remain 
a pressing security concern.  
 
As one example of the moral debate, the Catholic Church continues to engage with the 
nuclear question and until recently had not ruled out nuclear deterrence as an ethically 
justifiable policy. In 1982 it issued a statement indicating that, ‘In current conditions 
“deterrence” based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself but as a step on the way 
toward a progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable.’17 With the end of 
the Cold War and renewed attention on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons in 
the past decade, however, the Church appears poised to take a harsher stance on nuclear 
weapons. In a message delivered at the December 2014 humanitarian impacts conference in 
Vienna, Pope Francis stated: ‘I am convinced that the desire for peace and fraternity planted 
deep in the human heart will bear fruit in concrete ways to ensure that nuclear weapons are 
banned once and for all, to the benefit of our common home.’18 Especially for faith-based 
groups, there are no easy answers when it comes to questions of nuclear ethics.  
 
From a legal perspective, a 1996 Advisory Opinion by the International Court of Justice took 
on this issue but ended up reinforcing the ambiguity surrounding the ethics of nuclear 
deterrence. The court ruled unanimously that there was no customary, international or 
humanitarian legal precedent for authorised use of nuclear weapons – a victory for 
disarmament advocates. However, the opinion came with an open-ended caveat protecting 
nuclear deterrence:19  
 
[The] Court cannot lose sight of the fundamental right of every State to survival, and thus its 
right to resort to self-defence, in accordance with Article 51 of the [UN] Charter, when its 
survival is at stake. Nor can it ignore the practice referred to as a “policy of deterrence”, to 
which an appreciable section of the international community adhered for many years.  
 
There was significant division in the court on whether the use of nuclear weapons in all 
circumstances was illegal. In its reply to this part of the question put to the court by the UN 
General Assembly, the court determined, by the casting vote of the president, that it was 
unable to rule on whether the use of nuclear weapons was legal or illegal in extreme 
circumstances. Ultimately, in cases of existential threats and depending on context, nuclear 
deterrence is not necessarily considered illegal given that states have the right to defend their 
survival with any and all available means. 
 
Quinlan’s arguments are presented here with the intention of revisiting the ethical case for 
deterrence, which has been largely missing in the humanitarian impacts discussions. The 
world has undoubtedly moved on since Quinlan and the Cold War, but Russia has increased 
its reliance on nuclear weapons in its strategic doctrine and it is modernising its nuclear 
arsenal. It is therefore essential to return to the ethical debates that were in circulation when 
the Iron Curtain was firmly drawn.  
 
From the work of Quinlan and others, four principles of nuclear ethics can be distilled. First, 
security and ethics are intertwined. This principle highlights that nuclear policy does not 
occur in a vacuum. On the one hand, ignoring security concerns in order to prioritise ethics 
ignores states’ responsibility in international affairs and ability to influence events. Ukraine’s 
country statement at the Vienna Conference of the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons 
highlights the problem that such a position generates. Its statement included a list of Russian 
nuclear threats and argued for placing nuclear weapons in the appropriate security context: 
‘we regret that our community pays more attention to consequences but forgets about the 
reasons which bring nuclear threats so close to our lives’.20 On the other hand, a counter-
argument to this stance can be found among civil society groups in the humanitarian impacts 
initiative who advocate focusing solely on a specific interpretation of ethics, whereby, ‘we 
might start looking at the suffering nuclear weapons cause as suffering per se, rather than 
suffering that is necessary or unnecessary for this or that purpose.’21 This first principle 
suggests that, in the absence of key qualifications, both perspectives are flawed. As Michael 
Howard puts it, to use hard power with no consideration for ethical consequences is ‘the 
course of the gangster’.22 Quinlan and others express a similar view: an ethical approach must 
account for both consequences and security concerns.  
 
Second, nuclear weapons must remain, both in practice and policy, as weapons of last resort 
in the face of existential threats. Nuclear weapons, Quinlan argued, should not merely be 
viewed as indiscriminate offensive weapons, but also as weapons to prevent the destruction 
of the state and all its values: ‘our grappling with the issues of security has to remember 
Auschwitz as well as Hiroshima’.23 When considering the consequences of nuclear weapons 
use, he contested, ‘The comparison that has to be made is not between before and after – it is 
between the future “if we do” and the future “if we don’t”’.24 Circumstances warranting 
nuclear weapons use are so extreme they may seem inconceivable at times but it is possible 
that another state may resort to nuclear bullying as long as nuclear weapons exist.  
 
Third, from Quinlan’s perspective, deterrence policy relies on the credible threat of use. 
Therefore, possession needs to be accompanied by an expressed willingness to use nuclear 
weapons, although in extreme circumstances. This contrasts with views that were advanced 
during the Cold War-era debates: J Bryan Hehir argued from the moral theory of 
intentionality that ‘to intend to do evil is to be morally implicated in the evil even if the 
intention is never implemented’.25 Consequentialist approaches to ethics are often questioned 
on the grounds that ‘ends do not justify the means’; however, failing to consider 
consequences when it comes to nuclear weapons is to show equal disregard for both their 
massive humanitarian impacts and strategic influence among possessor states. Nuclear 
weapons are a business for ethical pragmatism. Deterrence can be explained on humanitarian 
grounds for avoiding large-scale conventional and nuclear war between the world’s great 
powers, those typically responsible for such conflicts and for preventing escalation that might 
threaten the ‘survival of the state’. This argument can be summarised in four succinct points 
made by Bruno Tertrais: no major-power conflict has taken place in nearly seventy years; 
there has never been a direct military conflict between two nuclear states26; no nuclear-armed 
country has ever been invaded; and no country covered by a nuclear guarantee27 has ever 
been the target of a major-state attack.28  
 
A counter-point to this position questions why some states have access to nuclear weapons 
while others do not. In other words, if nuclear weapons are so effective at preventing war, 
then every country, including Iran and North Korea, should be entitled to have them. 
Similarly, for those that do not currently possess them, emphasising the deterrence role of 
nuclear weapons makes them more valuable and risks proliferation. The debate between Scott 
Sagan and Kenneth Waltz as to whether or not ‘more may be better’ cannot be adequately 
covered by this article.29 Nonetheless, this counter-point falls flat for three reasons. First, as 
Tertrais notes, nuclear weapons prevented major power conflict and not every state faces 
such a threat. Second, states party to the NPT are legally obligated to not pursue nuclear 
weapons. And third, the complexities of the ‘second nuclear age’ have demonstrated that it 
cannot be assumed all states will act rationally with nuclear weapons.30   
 
Lastly, Quinlan emphasised that arms control and disarmament must be part of these ethical 
approaches to nuclear weapons. He suggested one ‘moral imperative’ was to search for arms 
control options since relying solely on deterrence is ‘plainly unacceptable’.31 These principles 
drove nuclear policy during the Cold War and are again relevant for NATO’s nuclear 
doctrine with the re-emergence of a Russian threat.  
 
Adhering to the North Atlantic and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaties  
Turning to the first principle of merging security and ethics, the new security environment 
requires NATO to revisit its nuclear deterrence and reassurance postures. The upcoming July 
2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw presents a good opportunity for such discussions. Russian 
aggression comes at a time of mixed messages and motives within NATO; new members are 
anxious for more security assurances – either through a greater physical presence of NATO 
forces or through declaratory policy – as opposed to others which may support the 
withdrawal of NATO tactical nuclear weapons from Europe in order to avoid provoking 
Russia.32 One of the tenets of international legal ethics is pacta sunt servanda – agreements 
must be kept. Under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, member states commit to 
contribute to one another’s security and, in extreme cases, to treat an attack on one as an 
attack on all. The principle of the endurance of treaties implies that ‘states’ moral and legal 
commitments are not capable of being overridden by prudential interests alone.’33 Or put 
another way, standing up for an ally in its time of need is a sign of good character, even if it 
is inconvenient. NATO is already taking steps to deliver tailored assurance to allies, 
including US troop deployments, joint exercises and the Very High Readiness Joint Task 
Force. These conventional and diplomatic gestures are an important symbol of the enduring 
commitment to Article 5. 
 
According to the second principle, nuclear weapons must remain a weapon of last resort for 
NATO and it can take steps to avoid escalation, such as developing a NATO-Russia 
Memorandum of Understanding to improve transparency and manage crises, as recently 
suggested by the European Leadership Network.34 In addition, NATO nuclear weapon 
possessor states can do more to improve the safety and security of their arsenals to reduce 
risks of accident.35 For these reasons, the risks entailed in the additional deployment of US 
nuclear weapons means that this is not necessarily the best way to reassure allies and stand up 
to Russian bullying. There are alternative, conventional means of strengthening NATO’s 
credibility both among allies and adversaries that can avoid escalation. Moreover, 
reassurance is not always military; it can also include diplomacy, consensus-building and 
policy statements. 
 
NATO’s nuclear deterrent must nonetheless be credible. Steps towards achieving this third 
principle include explicit measures such as declaratory policy and reinforcing the 
commitment to Article 5, as well as demonstrations of political will, such as defence 
spending among member states. This should not be done at the expense of conventional 
commitments, but rather as part of a cross-domain deterrence strategy. A credible NATO 
nuclear deterrent requires its members with nuclear weapons to maintain their own credible 
deterrents. Of the two nuclear contributors to the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, the US is 
likely to continue to modernise its nuclear triad, but the UK is in the midst of a difficult 
debate about the credibility and status of its own deterrent with the Trident Main Gate 
decision due to be made this year. Within NATO, over the course of the 2000s the US 
reduced the number of Atlantic patrols from 34 in 1999 to 10 in 201236, and reduced the 
number of nuclear-armed submarines in the Atlantic down to five, highlighting ‘the UK 
nuclear force’s ongoing role in providing strategic nuclear guarantees to other NATO 
states.’37 For the UK, contributing to a credible nuclear deterrent within NATO would entail 
the renewal of the Vanguard-class submarine responsible for the delivery of nuclear-armed 
Trident missiles and a policy of continuous-at-sea deterrence. While the UK and other allies 
can make conventional demonstrations to reassure allies, a more difficult question is whether 
the UK and other member states would fight a nuclear war for any of the other twenty-seven 
members of NATO.  
 
On the final principle of disarmament and arms control, the Alliance, in addition to its Article 
5 obligations, also has a responsibility to the broader international community and to uphold 
the commitment to disarmament as embodied in Article VI of the NPT.38 These concerns 
cannot and should not be ignored. A commitment to disarmament is not unprecedented for 
NATO; it is the standing policy. The NATO 2010 Strategic Concept lists a ‘world without 
nuclear weapons’ as a strategic priority, ‘based on the principle of undiminished security for 
all.’39 The 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review states that ‘NATO will continue to 
seek security at the lowest possible level of forces’ including nuclear forces.40 It also stated 
that nuclear drawdowns would depend on ‘reciprocal Russian actions to allow for significant 
reductions in forward-based non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to NATO.’41  
 
But NATO does not need to wait for Russia in order to make progress towards disarmament. 
One example is the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification that 
brings together states to explore the technical challenges of nuclear disarmament. Thus far 
twenty-five states have participated.42 Talks on Ukraine may present a unique opportunity to 
discuss reciprocal tactical nuclear withdrawals with Russia. As previously discussed, Russia 
does not appear to have an interest in reducing its reliance on nuclear weapons at this time, 
either doctrinally or in deployments. In the event that such NATO overtures are rebuked, the 
offer remains on the table and the Alliance should leave the door open for Moscow.  
 
The challenge for NATO, of course, is how to balance these priorities. Deploying more 
nuclear weapons to Europe may reassure allies, but would risk escalating tensions between 
the Alliance and Russia. Investment in nuclear weapons for safety and security reasons may 
help to avoid their accidental use, but is likely to be perceived by the Kremlin as 
modernisation and therefore undermine disarmament efforts. Unilaterally withdrawing 
nuclear weapons would contribute to disarmament, but cause concern among allies. Merging 
ethics and security is neither obvious nor easy. The humanitarian impacts initiative offers a 
forum for discussing these debates and is an opportunity for NATO to demonstrate a 
commitment to disarmament while strengthening deterrence. 
 
Abandoning the Ban  
Engaging with the humanitarian impacts initiative is difficult at present because it appears to 
be at a turning point with some of its members solely focused on a nuclear weapons ban. The 
ban is not a practical contribution to disarmament at this time as it will not gain traction with 
nuclear possessors. Nonetheless, it is still useful to explore plans for a ban and how it 
undermines the principles of nuclear ethics.  
 
Proponents of a nuclear weapons ban are following the ‘slippery slope’ model used to ban 
cluster munitions and anti-personnel mines. The approach calls for reframing how the 
weapon is thought of in order to promote an ‘ideational shift’ about the acceptability of these 
weapons.43 Proponents of this approach anticipate many of the counter-arguments; however 
they do not fully address at least two of them. First, unlike land mines and cluster munitions, 
nuclear weapons have not been used in warfare for seventy years. Therefore their damage is 
relatively low in comparison to other means of warfare that have dominated the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries. This is not to suggest that the suffering of victims of nuclear weapons 
is somehow less than those of cluster-munitions victims; rather land mines and cluster 
munitions have been used far more often than nuclear weapons. The cluster munitions ban 
was possible only in the aftermath of their repeated use, particularly in southern Lebanon, 
which demonstrated the immediacy of the threat and consequences.44 The ban included sub-
munitions, which were used in a ‘comparatively limited number’ of contexts, a principle 
activists suggest could be applied to a nuclear weapons ban as they were also used in limited 
number.45 According to The Economist, 4 million cluster bombs were fired on Lebanon in 
2006,46 whereas there are only two instances of nuclear weapons use. The slippery slope 
model does not apply on these grounds. Second, there are numerous other tactics or tools to 
achieve area denial – the objective of lands mines and cluster munitions. No such substitute 
exists to achieve the strategic objectives of nuclear weapons: primarily deterring other 
nuclear weapons.  
 
One component of the slippery slope approach, which is also another path towards 
disarmament, is building normative pressure on states to disarm. According to this argument, 
disarmament will require ‘a process of devaluing, or “un-valuing”, nuclear weapons since 
states are unlikely to surrender voluntarily what are considered highly prized national assets.’ 
According to this argument, nuclear possessors are waiting for ‘a Kantian universal and 
perpetual peace’ to disarm. This argument is stronger in highlighting the symbolic value of 
nuclear weapons, but is also incomplete. Based on the first principle of nuclear ethics 
(security and ethics are intertwined), devaluing and a norm will have to occur in conjunction 
with security developments. That does not mean that states must wait for ‘universal and 
perpetual peace’ but rather progress towards resolving the specific security concerns 
underpinning nuclear possession by states.47 States possess nuclear weapons for various 
reasons – prestige is one, but so is security. Additionally, any disarmament norm would 
compete with strong existing nuclear norms of non-use and deterrence.48   
 
A nuclear weapons ban at this time is premature as it would fail to take security concerns into 
consideration. For many supporters of the ban, the true objective is to pressure nuclear 
possessor states to make more progress within the NPT and the CD. However, the ban is an 
unnecessarily radical bludgeoning tool towards these ends. Quinlan stated his view on this:49 
 
To demand negotiation for which the political conditions simply do not yet exist is mere 
posturing. But there is genuine work to be done on identifying the conditions that would have 
to exist and the mechanisms that would need to be put in place, and on getting as much 
international understanding of all this as possible.  
 
Pushing for a ban ignores the security concerns of many states, placing them in a second-
class status. In one notable example of this, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear 
Weapons developed a lobby sheet for Ukraine which makes no mention of the country’s 
security situation or Russian aggression.50 If states and civil society actors are serious about 
disarmament, they will want to better understand the security concerns prohibiting some 
states from signing a ban at this time and will want to continue to educate participants about 
the consequences of nuclear weapons. 
 The ban need not be the future of the humanitarian impacts initiative nor does it represent the 
view of all participants. A middle path for the initiative would continue to provide a forum 
for further research about nuclear weapons and discussion about disarmament, highlighting 
the need to give voice to those states frustrated by the lack of progress to date. Their 
frustrations with the NPT and CD should not go ignored; nuclear possessor states can do 
more to address these, such as including non-nuclear weapon states in the P5 Plus discussions 
in the NPT and building consensus for the step-by-step approach towards disarmament. To 
truly demonstrate a commitment to long-term disarmament and the humanitarian approach, a 
nuclear possessor state could volunteer to host the next conference, which, as yet, has not 
been announced.  
 
Ongoing benefits of the initiative include nuclear education, putting a human face to nuclear 
weapons policy-making and exploring practical measures that could contribute to 
disarmament and ethical nuclear policies. Personal testimonies are one of the greatest 
strengths of the initiative in merging ethical and security concerns, particularly for the benefit 
of the next generation of nuclear experts. For example, Michelle Thomas, a victim of US 
nuclear testing, spoke emotionally of the horrific conditions she experienced growing up 
downwind from the Nevada Test Site and subsequent medical conditions among her family 
members. There are numerous other areas for further research that the initiative has 
highlighted and deserve further attention, rather than being sidelined by a focus on a legal 
mechanism. These include: scenarios of nuclear weapons use and what to do if deterrence 
fails;51 consequence management based on these scenarios; and scientific research on nuclear 
effects, including social and psychological impacts on survivors and military personnel.52 
Nuclear possessor states and NATO as a whole can demonstrate nuclear responsibility and a 
genuine desire for awareness by leading these efforts.  
 
The humanitarian impacts initiative would be particularly useful to NATO at this time: it 
offers a tool for pressuring Russia to return to arms control and refrain from nuclear sabre-
rattling. Participation in discussions on the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons serves 
as a reminder that NATO, including its nuclear possessors, is not the biggest barrier to 
disarmament; rather it is those states which refuse to engage altogether and are increasing 
their reliance on nuclear weapons. These should be the focus of pressure and disdain.  
 
Many within the humanitarian impacts initiative, particularly civil society groups, are 
unlikely to support this shift away from a ban and back to a practical, facts-based approach. 
The continued emphasis and pressure for a ban comes with risks. It will further divide nuclear 
possessors and non-nuclear weapon states, as well as undermine the credibility of the NPT 
and other multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. It will divide members of 
the humanitarian impacts initiative, slowing its momentum and negating much of the 
initiative’s authority that comes from its broad membership. Moreover, it comes with 
opportunity costs and draws attention away from other endeavours, such as pressuring Russia 
to return to arms control talks or, outside the nuclear realm, directing humanitarian attention 
to pressing concerns such as Syria’s refugee crisis. Participants should abandon the idea of a 
nuclear weapons ban and instead focus on using the humanitarian impacts initiative as a 
forum for equal discussion on the consequences of nuclear weapons use and for rebuilding 
transparency and communication between nuclear possessor and non-possessor states and 
civil society.  
 
Conclusion  
To summarise, both NATO and the humanitarian impacts initiative can take steps to practise 
nuclear ethics. NATO can strengthen the credibility of its deterrent as a means to reassure 
allies, avoid escalation, lay the groundwork for further arms control, demonstrate restraint in 
the face of Russian aggression and engage with the humanitarian impacts initiative. Perhaps 
one of the most radical ideas in this article is for a nuclear possessor state to host the next 
conference, which would be an important step towards demonstrating a commitment to 
disarmament and redirecting the initiative’s narrative. Participants of the humanitarian 
impacts initiative can incorporate security issues into their efforts and provide a forum for 
discussion of nuclear ethics. The path to disarmament is slower than many would like, but if 
it is to be effective it must be rooted in pragmatism and cognizant of the genuine security 
concerns of states. For this reason, a nuclear weapons ban at this time suggests ‘political 
posturing’ among some of its supporters, to quote Quinlan. 
 
The late David Fisher observed, ‘This lack of progress (towards disarmament) may reflect, 
however, not just moral obduracy on the part of policymakers but also the grim reality that 
the advent of nuclear weapons has left no easy moral choices.’53 These are heavy issues 
indeed. Supporters of a nuclear weapons ban are not themselves immoral or ill-intentioned; 
rather they are exasperated by the slow pace of disarmament among nuclear possessors and 
are exploring alternative methods for progress. This frustration must be acknowledged and 
redirected to a more pragmatic and ethical approach. First principles as articulated by Quinlan 
and others – such as preventing loss of life, standing up to aggressors and demonstrating 
fortitude in protecting a society’s values – offer a useful starting point for considering ethical 
questions in the appropriate strategic context. Nuclear deterrence obviously does not 
contradict these first principles; indeed, it seems rooted in them.  
 
To ignore security realities is to be ethically irresponsible. For many states, the utility of 
nuclear weapons has not gone away. And just as the experiences of the victims of nuclear 
weapons cannot be ignored, neither can the concerns of states relying on nuclear weapons to 
protect their populations in the event of an existential threat. One should not be subordinate to 
the other, both must be heard. The wisdom of the past offers a pathway for the future. For 
NATO, that means strengthening nuclear deterrence and assurance in the face of Russian 
aggression. And for the humanitarian impacts initiative, that means abandoning the specious 
notion that a nuclear weapons ban is a practical step towards disarmament at this time. 
Rather, it is an unethical waste of time. 
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